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Introduction
Since the initial article on the bioeco-
nomics of incidental catch and discard-
ing of marine fish species (Ward, 1994), 
18 articles have referenced it in further-
ance of the fisheries economics study of 
bycatch or incidental catch. This is by 
no means a definitive list, since in the 
same issue of Marine Resource Eco-
nomics, Arnason (1994) and Anderson 
(1994) both addressed discarding and 
high-grading in individual transfer-
able quota (ITQ) fisheries. Discarded 
bycatch has been a problem of note 
in the fisheries management literature 
as reviewed by Ward (1994) since the 
early 1980’s (FAO and IDRC, 1982). 
Hall et al. (2000) characterized bycatch, 
estimated at 8% of global catch (7.3 
million t) during 1992–2001 (Kelleher, 
2006), as one of the most significant 
problems affecting fisheries manage-
ment. This level of bycatch was alleged 
to affect biodiversity, waste life (creat-
ing, for some, a moral issue), hinder 
profitability, increase management 
costs, lead to sociocultural problems 
and conflicts, and increase juvenile fish 
mortality. 
Solutions proposed for the bycatch 
management problem that have been 
deemed successful (Hall et al., 2000) 
are primarily command and control 
methods, for example:
•  Spatial and temporal closures 
(closed areas and seasons); 
•  Harvest performance criteria (back-
ing down tuna purse seines to aid 
dolphin, Tursiops spp., release); 
•  Gear modifications (bycatch reduc-
tion devices (BRD); turtle excluder 
devices (TED), gear bans, acousti-
cal pingers, discard bans, hook size, 
mesh sizes, etc.) that reduce catch-
ability for nontarget species; and 
• Bycatch limits per vessel. 
These command and control measures 
have been termed “Darwinian selection 
of fishers,” which actually translates to 
the idea that less efficient fishermen are 
forced from the fishery as increasingly 
complex regulations are imposed to 
reduce bycatch levels (Hall et al., 2000).
Although no clear management ob-
jective for these command and control 
regulations is stated, one can infer from 
Hall et al. (2000) that economic effi-
ciency is a second-best consideration, 
if it is considered at all. Only fishermen 
who can produce catches at the lowest 
ecological cost, that is, with the least 
waste and habitat impact, will survive 
to inherit the fishery. The eradication 
of bycatch in and of itself, for no other 
reason and at whatever cost to fisheries, 
is the inferred management objective. If 
a neoclassical interpretation of econom-
ics is used, then this management goal is 
recast in terms of the trade-off in alloca-
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ABSTRACT—A review of the significant 
contributions in the peer-reviewed literature 
indicates that the discarding of marine fish 
known as bycatch remains one of the most 
significant problem facing fisheries manag-
ers.  Bycatch has negative affects on marine 
biodiversity, is ripe with ethical and moral 
issues surrounding the waste of life from 
increased juvenile fish mortality, hinders 
commercial profitability and recreational 
satisfaction, increases management costs, 
and results in socio-cultural problems and 
conflicts. While appearing to have a simple 
conservation engineering solution, reduc-
ing or eliminating bycatch in marine fishing 
operations given the presently existing regu-
lated open access management environment 
is demonstrated to actually be so complex 
that its effects can appear to be counter-intu-
itive.  An ecosystem simulation model that 
explicitly incorporates the human and bio-
logical dimensions is used to evaluate pro-
posed bycatch reduction regulations for two 
fishing fleets exploiting three out of seven 
species of fish, each with ten cohorts, in 
two resource areas. One of the fishing fleets 
is divided into two components represent-
ing commercial fishermen and recreational 
anglers. The seven fish species represent 
predator, prey, and competitor behaviors 
and one stock is treated as an endangered 
species. The results displayed in a series of 
figures demonstrate the potential unintended 
effects of simplistic management approaches 
and the need for a holistic and comprehen-
sive approach to bycatch management. 
That is, an ecosystem model that explicitly 
incorporates socio-cultural and biophysical 
attributes into a common framework allows 
the magnitude and direction of behavioral 
responses to be predicted based on changes 
in governance or biophysical constraints to 
determine if management goals and objec-
tives have been obtained through the use of 
quantitative metrics.
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tion of species between discards in one 
fishery and harvest in another fishery.
Discarded bycatch continues to be a 
concern in the marine fisheries literature, 
with additional theoretical, empirical, 
and policy analyses being published 
each year. One weakness of these sepa-
rate analyses is the lack of comparability 
of their results. A common framework 
is needed to compare and contrast these 
different studies using the same analyti-
cal approach based on a common set of 
underlying assumptions. Comparabil-
ity of results will provide additional 
information to fishery managers who 
are faced with this problem in actual 
fisheries.
The initial analysis by Ward (1994) 
and Ward and Macinko (1996) is 
presented and then modified into a 
multi-cohort, multi-species, multi-
stock, multi-fleet, multi-vessel capable 
framework. We then adapt this model to 
incorporate additional analytical results 
from selected authors including, but 
not limited to, Arnason (1994), Boyce 
(1996), and Abbott and Wilen (2009). 
Although still a qualitative approach, 
the increasing complexity of the 
framework should provide information 
not presently inferable from the inde-
pendent assessments. This approach 
should allow the short-sightedness of 
the present parochial biological ap-
proach to bycatch and discard manage-
ment to be replaced by an enlightened, 
multidisciplinary, scientific approach 
in the future.
Review
The foundation for any scientific as-
sessment is a strong theoretical model 
from which a working hypothesis can 
be developed for statistical testing. This 
section will review bycatch, discarding, 
and high-grading from a theoretical 
perspective. Empirical applications will 
then be reviewed to determine whether 
evidence exists in support of the theo-
retical conclusions.
Theoretical Analyses
Since its original recognition (Gunter, 
1936; Lindner, 1936), bycatch has been 
analyzed in the biological literature in 
terms of its impact on fish population 
abundance (Nichols et al.1). The first 
study of economic effects (Blomo and 
Nichols, 1974) found a negligible price 
effect if total trawl bycatch (368,000,000 
lb) were converted to fish meal or oil 
reduction instead of being discarded.
The first bioeconomic specification 
(Clark, 1985) suggested that discarding 
in commercial fishing operations occurs 
because retention of the discarded spe-
cies is prohibited by regulation, the 
discarded species has a nonmarket 
value, the discarded species has no 
commercial value, or a valuable species 
is discarded to make room for a more 
valuable species in the hold of a fishing 
craft (high-grading).
Clark (1985) also developed a linear 
programming model to calculate the 
optimal trip length for a fishing firm 
that harvests progressively more valu-
able species in a multi-species fishery 
that is unconstrained by stock abun-
dance. Ward (1994) extended this linear 
programming model into a long-run, 
static, Gordon-Schaeffer model with 
stock size constraints that included 
downstream effects on bycatch species-
dependent commercial and recreational 
fisheries. Thus, the undesirable output 
in one directed fishery becomes the 
desirable output of a second directed 
fishery—a rather paradoxical result in 
and of itself.
The initial analysis by Ward (1994) 
focused on the effect of a BRD on 
stock conservation using a simple 
two-species Gordon-Schaeffer model 
of the form:
 δx/δt = F(x) – qxExX  
(1)
 δy/δt = G(y) – qyxExY 
where F(x) is the growth function of 
directed fishery species X,
 G(y) is the growth function of 
the bycatch species Y,
1Nichols, S., A. Shah, and G. Pellegrin, Jr. 1987. 
Estimates of annual shrimp fleet bycatch for 
thirteen finfish species in the offshore waters 
of the Gulf of Mexico. Draft Rep., Miss. Lab., 
Southeast Fish. Sci. Cent., Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv, 
NOAA, Pascagoula, Miss., 28 p.
 qxExX = hx is the harvest level of 
species X in the directed fishery,
 qyxExY= hyx is the bycatch of 
species Y in the directed fishery 
for species X,
 qx is the catchability coefficient 
of the gear for species X in the 
directed fishery for species X,
 qyx is the catchability coefficient 
of the gear for species Y in the 
directed fishery for species X, 
 x is the biomass of species X,
 y is the biomass of the bycatch 
species Y, and
 Ex is the level of total fishing 
effort for both species in the 
fishery for species X.
This simple bioeconomic model of 
a stylized fishery that generates and 
discards a bycatch species that is uti-
lized by another independent directed 
fishery consisting of commercial and 
recreational components is based on 
the assumptions that underlie the 
perfectly competitive market model 
with two exceptions. First, a key 
input in the production process is 
limited, acting as a constraint which 
is represented by:
F(X) > 0, F″(X) < 0, 
and F′(X) = Kx = 0 for 0 ≤ X ≤ Kx 
G(Y) > 0, G″(Y) < 0, 
and G′(Y) = Ky = 0 for 0 ≤ Y ≤ Ky
where Kx and Ky are the carrying ca-
pacities of the environment for species 
X and Y. 
Second, the clearly defined, enforce-
able property rights that ensure free 
mobility of inputs and outputs are 
lacking for the in situ marine fishery 
resource. Under this open-access sce-
nario, bionomic equilibrium is found 
where:
 π = Pxhx + Pyhyx – Cx Ex = 0 (2)
where π is profits,
 Px is the ex-vessel price for 
species X,
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 Py is the ex-vessel price for 
species Y, and
 Cx is the unit cost of fishing 
effort in the directed fishery for 
species X.
Based on this simple model specifica-
tion harvest (hx) and bycatch (hyx) are 
calculated at their long-run equilibrium 
levels:
 h r C P q C P q Kx x x x x x x x x=  ( ) / ( ) – / ( ) 1  (3)
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where rx is the logistic growth rate,
 Kx, Ky are the carrying capacity 
of the environment for species 
X and Y, and 
 Py = 0 because the bycatch is 
discarded.
Harvest levels for the commercial (hyc) 
and recreational (hyr) fisheries directed 
at the bycatch species (Y) are similarly 
derived:
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and based on the assumption that utility 
(U) is equal to zero in the long run, then
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where Vy is the marginal value of a 
recreationally caught fish, with a stable 
long run equilibrium at
 Yc = Cyc / Py qyc = 
 Cyr / Vy qyr =Yr. (7)
Based on this stylized fishery model, 
the comparative static analysis of cost-
less conservation engineering manage-
ment measures results in no long-run 
increase in the bycatch species (Y) 
abundance level. Fishing effort levels 
are shown to expand to offset any 
improvement in stock size, and only a 
small increase in harvest levels result in 
the bycatch species (Y) fisheries.
Arnason (1994) focuses instead on 
the possibility that different manage-
ment regimes can create different 
incentive levels for discarding bycatch 
that can affect the magnitude of the 
discarding and could lead to a remedy 
for the problem different from that of 
the conservation engineering strategy 
analyzed in Ward (1994). The evalu-
ation of a dynamic sole-owner model 
of the form:
 Max  e d e d x p rt dt, ( , , , )exp( ) ,pi −∫  (8)
 s.t. δ δx t G x x i/ ( ) ( )= − ∑  (9)
where π is the profit function,
 e is fishing effort,
 d is the discard level,
 x is biomass,
 p is price,
 G(x) is the growth function of 
species x, and 
 x(i) is the harvest level of spe-
cies x by grade levels (i), 
this results in the discarding rule:
 d(i) >0 if p(i) + 
 CDd(0,i) < CLl(e,x,i) – 0,i (10)
where CD(d(i),i) is the cost associated 
with the discarding of fish of 
grade i,
 CDd(0,i) is the marginal dis-
carding cost,
 CL(1(i),i) is the retained catch 
cost of fish of grade i, and
 CLl(e,x,i) is the marginal cost 
of retaining catch.
Therefore, p(i) + CDd(0,i) is the mar-ginal cost of discarding and CL1(e,x,i) – 
0,i is the marginal benefit of discarding. 
Equation 10 indicates that discarding 
occurs [d(i)>0] if the marginal costs 
of discarding catch are less than the 
marginal benefit of discarding fish of 
grade (i). With one minor modifica-
tion, because the discarding activity 
of a single fishing craft as formulated 
by Arnason (1994) does not generate a 
stock externality effect, the discarding 
rule for an open-access fishery is the 
same as Equation 10: 
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where j refers to the fishing firm.
Of particular interest is the analy-
sis of the discarding issue under ITQ 
management systems with continu-
ous and discontinuous ITQ programs. 
Under the continuous ITQ system, the 
fishing firm has a permanent stock of 
ITQ’s not differentiated by grade (i), 
but based on aggregate catch volumes 
where discards are not counted against 
ITQ holdings. Equation 8 for firm (j) 
becomes: 
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where Z is the level of quota holdings 
traded, and 
 Q is the total allowable catch 
(TAC) that is equal to the total 
quota issued.
This results in the discard rule:
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where σ(j) represents the shadow price 
of ITQ’s for firm j or the instantaneous 
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gain from renting the quota foregone by 
using the ITQ share for landings; i.e., 
σ(j) = rs – δs/δt > 0
where r is the discount rate,
 s is the market price of quota 
share, and
 δs/δt is the capital gain or loss 
of holding quota.
 δ(j) is the firm’s shadow price 
for biomass; δ(j) = δV/δx > 0.
ITQ’s lead to an excessive incentive to 
discard if shares are tied to landings and 
not to catch.
The ITQ discarding function is:
 Γ (i) = CLl(y(i) – 
 0,i) + Ω(j) – p(i) – CDd(0,i). (14)
The optimal discarding function is: 
 Γ (i) = CLl(y(i) – 0,i) – 
 p(i) – CDd(0,i).  (15)
If Ω(j) Ξ σ(j) – δ(j) > 0, then an incen-
tive to discard above the social optimum 
defined in Equation 10 and 11 exists. 
If δ(j) → 0 as j →∞, then Ω(j) → σ(j); 
i.e.,
limj→∞ Ω(j)→σ(j),
when Ω(j) Ξ σ(j) – δ(j) = 0, this 
indicates an indifference to 
discarding, but when
 Ω(j) Ξ σ(j) – δ(j) < 0, no incen-
tive to discard is implied.
In an analysis similar to Clark (1985), 
Anderson (1994) created a fishing-
vessel, hold-capacity criteria for high-
grading. Instead of a multi-species 
fishery with harvests progressively 
focusing on more valuable species, 
demand for fishing craft hold capacity 
is determined when high and low valued 
species grades exist. The Lagrangian 
formulated by Anderson (1994) for 
constrained trip profit is:
 L = πt + λ1 (B+D – yE) + 
 λ2 (αLye – D), (16)
where πt is profit,
 λ1 is the shadow price for land-
ing minus discards plus hold 
capacity,
 λ2 is the discard shadow price,
 B is the hold capacity of a 
vessel,
 D is the discard of one unit of 
low valued fish,
 y is the annual catch per unit of 
effort,
 E is fishing effort, and
 αL is the percentage of yield 
consisting of low valued indi-
viduals.
The demand for vessel hold capacity can 
be expressed in terms of its marginal 
shadow price:
 λ1 = PH – 1/ αH [C′/y + αLCD], (17)
where PH is the price of the high value 
component of the species,
 αH is the percentage of the yield 
that is high valued,
 C′ = CE(E) is the marginal trip 
cost, and
 CD is the variable cost of dis-
carding one unit of fish.
When λ2 equals zero, for the case that 
the discard constraint does not hold, 
the demand for hold capacity becomes:
 λ1 = PL + CD. (18)
The shadow price λ1 represents the 
price for ITQ (PITQ). If PITQ is greater than PL + CD when λ2 is equal to zero, 
then high-grading will occur just as in 
the case when hold capacity constrains 
landings; i.e., PITQ > PL + CD creates an 
incentive to high-grade, and when PITQ 
≤ PL + CD, no incentive to high-grade 
is created. 
These three studies indicate that, 
first, discarding of bycatch can have 
serious effects on fisheries dependent 
on the bycatch species when a stock 
externality exists. Second, when the 
stock externality is not binding on an 
individual vessel, the open-access and 
socially optimal or sole-owner fishery 
face the same high-grading criteria in 
a differentiated fishery, which could 
be represented by different sizes or 
cohorts for a single species. Finally for 
the sole-owner fishery, high-grading can 
occur under conditions where the hold 
capacity of a vessel constrains landings 
just as ITQ’s constrain landings.
To explicitly incorporate ITQ’s into 
an open-access fishery, Boyce (1996) 
assumed that of two species, one is 
harvested solely in fishery 1 and the 
other species is harvested as bycatch in 
fishery 1 while being the target species 
in fishery 2. Boyce (1996) extended the 
analysis in Ward (1994) by establishing 
a total allowable catch (TAC) for species 
one (S1) and species two (S2). Boyce 
investigated the effect of allowing by-
catch in fishery 1 to be sold, not sold, 
or have an existence value [δ = 1,0,-1, 
respectively] where the sale price P2 and 
existence value are identical; and for the 
case of an active commercial fishery 2 
(γ =1) and no active commercial fishery 
2 (γ =0). The optimization problem for 
the social planner for two fisheries is:
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+ −
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pi δ
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 (19)
where K1 is the cost of an additional 
fishing craft in fishery i,
 b(h1) is the per day removal of 
the bycatch species by fishery 
1 for a harvest level (h1) of the 
target species,
 ni is the number of firms,
 Ti is the length of the fishing 
season in fishery I, and 
 Pi is the price for species i.
The key finding from Boyce (1996) 
is his proposition 8 that fishery 1 would 
have lower aggregate bycatch if ratio-
nalized due to a reduction in the number 
of vessels, even though bycatch per 
vessel may increase or decrease. This 
is a somewhat different result than in 
Arnason (1994) or Anderson (1994) for 
the individual vessel because the open-
access stock externality was corrected 
by adopting ITQ’s. 
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That ITQ’s could reduce the aggre-
gate level of bycatch was also found 
by Hoagland and Jin (1997), which 
determined that market-based incen-
tives have several advantages over 
traditional command-and-control ap-
proaches such as BRD’s. These advan-
tages include cost-effective allocations 
of environmental controls, incentives 
for firms to seek technological solu-
tions, flexibility, returns to the public 
for the use of its natural resources, and 
the potential for lower administrative 
costs relative to regulated open-access 
fisheries. Even if unsuccessful in reduc-
ing discarded bycatch sufficiently on 
its own, improvements in economic 
efficiency due to ITQ adoption should 
be more than sufficient to cover the 
costs of regulated BRD gear adoption 
in ITQ fisheries.
The comparative statics analysis of 
Boyce (1996) assumes that bycatch 
is a function of the harvest rate of the 
target species, which fails to allow for 
changes in bycatch species abundance 
or gear selectivity. Ward and Macinko 
(1996), after recognizing the complex 
ecosystem implications of bycatch dis-
cards, introduced a dynamic framework 
to the bioeconomics of this manage-
ment problem as an extension to Ward 
(1994).
In addition to introducing opti-
mal control techniques, the dynamic 
bioeconomic model relaxes the as-
sumption that the commercial sector 
exploits the bycatch species before the 
recreational sector, establishes a stock 
recruitment relationship, introduces 
a cost for the gear modification, and 
reduces the efficiency of the fishing 
gear that generates the bycatch due to 
the adoption of the BRD. This approach 
also allows the estimation of net ben-
efits over time between the long-run 
equilibriums in the fishery, which can 
be used as an indicator of management 
success.
As in the static model, the population 
dynamics are expressed as: 
 δx/δt = F(x) – qxExX 
 δy/δt = G(y) – qyxExY –  (20)
 qycEycY – qyrEyrY
where qyxExY is the bycatch level of 
species Y in the species X fishery,
 qycEycY is the commercial har-
vest level of species Y in the 
species Y fishery, and 
 qyrEyrY is the recreational har-
vest of species Y in the species 
Y fishery.
Changes in fishing effort with respect to 
time are represented by:
 δEx/δt = K(PxqxX – Cx)Ex
 δEyc/δt = K(PycqycY – Cyc)Eyc  (21)
 δEyr/δt = K(VyqyrY – Cyr)Eyr
where Pi is the exogenously deter-
mined ex-vessel price for spe-
cies (X) and (Y), i = x, yc,
 K is now a constant of pro-
portionality between current 
profits and the change in the 
effort level (Ei), Ci is the constant unit effort cost i = x, yc, yr, and
 Vy is the marginal value of rec-
reationally caught fish.
The more realistic assumptions un-
derlying this simple, stylized-fishery, 
bioeconomic model reveal the com-
plexity of the bycatch problem for 
fishery managers. First, any short-run 
improvement in species Y abundance 
caused by the adoption of a BRD in the 
fishery for species X will be eliminated 
in the long run because fishing effort 
levels can expand in the open-access 
fisheries for species Y. Second, the 
greater the inefficiency in the fishing 
gear for species X caused by the adop-
tion of the BRD, the less bycatch will 
be reduced as a result of the increase 
in fishing effort by fishermen in the 
species X fishery. Third, increased 
harvesting costs resulting from the 
BRD regulations cause both effort and 
bycatch levels to decline, implying that 
landing taxes or ITQ’s that would allow 
resource rents to be captured rather than 
squandered as in the BRD scenario 
would decrease bycatch levels as found 
by Boyce (1996). The implication for 
conservation engineering is that an ex-
pensive BRD that does not reduce gear 
efficiency for the directed fishery that 
generates the bycatch will not increase 
the abundance of the bycatch species 
if regulated open-access commercial 
and recreational fisheries exist that are 
directed at the bycatch species. 
A slightly different tack on gear 
selectivity is provided by Escapa and 
Prellezo (2003), who focus on assessing 
the effect of harvest levels on growth 
rates of a fish stock. Modifying the 
optimal control problem so that growth 
becomes:
 G(x,θ) = (r + θ)x(1 – x/k), (22)
where G(x,θ) is the growth function 
of species x,
 θ is θ(γ1, γ2, α) = 1 – αγ1 – (1 
– α)γ2 is the selectivity level of 
the fishing gear,
 γ1 = 1 for a very selective gear 
that does not affect the growth 
rate of the resource, and
 γ2 > 1 for nonselective gear 
that does affect the growth rate 
of the resource, the modified 
Golden Rule (Clark, 1990) 
becomes:
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where δ is the discount rate, 
 c(x) is the harvest cost, and 
 c′(x) is the marginal harvest 
cost.
This implies that arbitrary harvest 
shares between user groups are no 
longer optimal if the harvesting gear 
affects the resource growth rate.
If harvest costs differ between user 
groups exploiting the fish stock, then 
Equation 23 becomes: 
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The social planner’s role now requires 
the joint determination of the optimal 
stock and the fishing quota. Maximizing 
the present value of both user groups 
exploiting the fish stock further modifies 
the Golden Rule to: 
 δ θ= −
′ +
′



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G x
h h c x
h h c x
G x
x
i i
j i
( *, )
( / ) ( *)
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(25)
This revised “Golden Rule,” represented 
by Equation 25, can be used to set both 
optimal stock and harvest rates for both 
user groups where the least selective 
gear also has the lowest harvest cost 
relative to the other user group. Other-
wise, one or the other user group will 
not be able to participate in the fishery 
if optimal stock size is to be achieved 
when growth rates are affected by the 
harvest technology. This result is par-
ticularly problematic for setting sector 
shares in fisheries because suboptimal 
efficiency levels might result.
Regulating bycatch using common 
pool output quotas is assessed in a 
predictive renewable resource model 
(Abbott and Wilen, 2009) that com-
plimented Ward (1994) by finding that 
short-run utility from technological im-
provements may be limited even when 
a target fishery for the bycatch species 
does not exist. Without an increase in 
resource rents from conservation engi-
neering gear modifications, the rational 
fisherman has no incentive to “invest 
in or assist in the development of such 
technologies” (Abbott and Wilen, 2009).
An additional contribution by Abbott 
and Wilen (2009) is the explicit deri-
vation of one of the remedies recom-
mended by Arnason (1994). A Pigou-
vian tax (τ) can be derived where the 
marginal benefits of increased harvest 
equal the marginal cost (c + τ) at the 
optimal season length (T) utilizing a 
Nash equilibrium game theory strat-
egy where both the target species and 
bycatch species common-pool quotas 
could be binding:
 
τ α
α
* ( – / ) / ( / )
[ / ] ,
= −[ ]
− −
P n b n
Tn Q Cx
1 1 1
1  (26)
where P is the price of the target 
species,
 C is a unit cost due to potential 
losses in processing, yield, and 
product caused by the diversion 
of resources to the sorting and 
discarding of bycatch,
 Qx is the target species quota,
 n is the number of participants 
(overcapacity),
 α and b are positive constants 
that relate bycatch levels to 
target species harvest levels (hB and hx, respectively).
Equation 26 indicates that this by-
catch tax increases with the target spe-
cies price (P) and the number of partici-
pants (n). The bycatch tax declines with 
increases in the sorting and discarding 
costs (C). Inefficient gears that are char-
acterized as having high catchability co-
efficients (b) for bycatch species result 
in lower unit taxes. Since taxes and ITQ 
unit prices are theoretically equivalent 
(Clark, 1980), the Pigouvian tax could 
represent the bycatch ITQ market price.
Empirical Studies
The preceding theoretical model 
results, supported as they are by the 
strict logic of mathematics, need to be 
confirmed by empirical testing as in 
any scientific field of research. Unfortu-
nately, empirical studies of bycatch, dis-
cards, and high-grading are few and far 
between in the literature. Hoagland and 
Jin (1997) extended Ward and Macinko 
(1996) to include competitive (γi < 0, i = x,y), independent (γi = 0, i = x,y), mutu-
alistic (γi > 0, i = x,y), predatory (γi > 0, 
γj < 0, i ≠ j), and commensalistic (γi > 
0, γj = 0, i ≠ j) biological relationships 
between species.
Rather than a commercial and recre-
ational fishery for the bycatch species, 
Hoagland and Jin (1997) developed a 
dynamic model for a nonconsumptive, 
passive use bycatch species as might be 
expected for a protected or endangered 
species; their example species was the 
harbor porpoise, Phocoena phocoena, or 
dolphin. This required the development 
of a damage function that changed the 
maximization problem to:
 Max
B E x D E y CE e dt
E
rt
=
− −[ ] −∫ ( , ) ( , ) ,  (27)
where B(E,x) is the social benefit 
function,
 D(E,y) is the damage function,
 CE is the total cost of effort (E),
 X is the biomass of the target 
species, and
 Y is the biomass of the bycatch 
species.
Rather than solving for the time-paths 
between equilibrium values as in Ward 
and Macinko (1996), Hoagland and Jin 
(1997), and Hoagland et al.2 solve for 
the steady-state or long-run equilibrium 
values. Nonetheless, one interesting 
implication can be derived from this 
empirical model based on parameters 
taken from the literature for eastern 
tropical Pacific yellowfin tuna, Thun-
nus albacares. That is, the biological 
relationships affect the optimal level of 
fishing effort when a damage function 
exists as a management tool.
A similar analysis was conducted by 
Griffin et al. (1993) to determine the 
change in net benefits for the Gulf of 
Mexico shrimp (Panaeus setiferous, 
Panaeus axtecus, Panaeus duorarum) 
fishery due to the adoption of TED’s 
through Amendment 9 to the Gulf of 
Mexico Shrimp Fishery Management 
Plan. This assessment resulted in the 
estimation of negative rents that would 
cause this regulated open-access fish-
ery’s fleet to decline in size.
Ward et al.3 reestimated the net pres-
ent value lost due to the regulatory TED 
requirement at $86.2 million to the 
shrimp fishery, which was accompanied 
by a 1.8% decline in fishing fleet size. 
Similarly for finfish BRD’s, the cost to 
the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery in 
2Hoagland, P., D. Jin, P. Lee, C. Croft, L. David-
son, and S. Wallis. 1996. Market-based incen-
tives to reduce fisheries bycatch. NOAA Contr. 
50-DGNF-5-00172, Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv, NOAA, 
Silver Spring, Md., Feb., 120 p.
3Ward, J. M., J. Kirkley, and W. Keithly. 2009. 
A meta-analysis of the cumulative effects of 
regulation on the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. 
Draft Rep., Natl. Mar. Fish. Serv, NOAA, Silver 
Spring, Md., Jan., 35 p.
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lost present value of net benefits was 
estimated at $27.4 million. As part of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment 
of Amendment 9, the economic value 
changes in terms of adjustments to total 
revenue were positive for the commer-
cial red snapper, Lutjanus campechanus, 
fishery but had no impact on the recre-
ational reef fish fishery4 as predicted by 
Ward (1994).
Although not directly related to the 
estimation of the effect of reducing or 
eliminating the discarding of bycatch 
species in a directed fishery, Schuhmann 
and Easley (2000) use the theoretical 
approach of Ward (1994) and Ward and 
Macinko (1996) to estimate the benefits 
transfer between the commercial and 
recreational red drum, Sciaenops ocel-
latus, fishery. This assessment is based 
on derived demand analysis (Thurman 
and Easley, 1992) for the commercial 
fishery and a recreational random utility 
model. Although a change in red drum 
bycatch levels in the Gulf of Mexico 
shrimp fishery is not the focus of the 
benefits transfer between the directed 
commercial and recreational red drum 
fisheries, the analysis does create an 
empirical framework that could be used 
to estimate this type of fishery change.
Lastly, an empirical study by Garza-
Gil and Varela-Lafuente (2007) ana-
lyzed the intra-species bycatch impacts 
on the European southern hake, Merluc-
cius merluccius, stock. Gear selectivity 
for trawl and longline fisheries was 
investigated to determine whether hake 
stocks were being efficiently exploited. 
Results from a dynamic model based on 
values estimated from a hake database 
found that if trawling selectivity im-
proved from 0.6 to 0.2 such that juvenile 
fish were excluded from the catch, then 
the biomass level and its shadow price 
would increase from $2,917 to $4,208 
(44%). Even though total fishing effort 
declines by 10%, trawl effort increases 
by 147% with a decline of 36% in the 
longline fishery. However, harvest for 
both fisheries increases by 45% and 7%, 
respectively.
Review Summary
In short, Ward (1994) analyzed the 
discarding of an incidentally caught spe-
cies in the classical open-access fishery 
to determine the efficacy of the conser-
vation engineering approach to fisheries 
management, which, even though cost 
less to harvesters, was unsuccessful in 
conserving bycatch species stocks. Al-
ternative remedies offered by Arnason 
(1994) and Anderson (1994) for the ITQ 
high-grading and discard management 
problem include taxes, subsidies, and 
landings restrictions as well as better 
enforcement.
Arnason (1994) focused on discard-
ing within different grades of the same 
species as a cause of high-grading in 
ITQ fisheries, while high-grading in ITQ 
fisheries according to Anderson (1994) 
was due to limited hold capacity for the 
individual fishing craft. That is, accord-
ing to Anderson’s analysis, ITQ’s, which 
act as a substitute for a hold capacity 
constraint, can increase high-grading 
more than would exist in an optimal 
fishery. Although still a comparative 
statics analysis, Boyce (1996) sug-
gested that a fishery could have lower 
aggregate bycatch if rationalized due 
to a reduction in the number of vessels, 
even though bycatch per vessel may 
increase or decrease because the open-
access stock externality was corrected 
by adopting ITQ’s. 
Using a dynamic approach, the im-
plication of Ward and Macinko (1996) 
for conservation engineering is that an 
expensive BRD that does not reduce 
gear efficiency for the directed fishery 
that generates the bycatch, will not 
increase the abundance of the bycatch 
species if regulated open-access com-
mercial and recreational fisheries that 
are directed at the bycatch species exist. 
In a general dynamic analysis, Escapa 
and Prellezo (2003) revise the “Golden 
Rule” derived by Clark (1990) when fish 
stock growth rates are affected by the 
harvest technology. Both optimal stock 
and harvest rates for both user groups 
must be set where the least selective gear 
also has the lowest harvest cost relative 
to the other user group. If not, one user 
group will not be able to participate in 
4MRAG Americas, Inc. 1997. Peer review of the 
science and management of red snapper (Lutja-
nus campechanus) in the Gulf of Mexico” Tech. 
meeting, New Orleans, La., Aug.
the fishery if optimal stock size is to 
be achieved. This result is particularly 
problematic for setting sector shares in 
fisheries because suboptimal efficiency 
levels might result.
The Abbott and Wilen (2009) analy-
sis of common-pool quotas, season 
length, taxes, and ITQ prices to achieve 
a Nash (1950) equilibrium under game 
theoretic conditions confirms concerns 
about the conservation engineering ap-
proach and suggests that the behavioral 
and institutional solutions have not 
been adequately addressed. Bycatch is 
a complex result of gear, spatial ecol-
ogy, and regulatory interactions, but 
it is primarily behavioral. Research 
should be based on incentive-based 
approaches such as individual transfer-
able bycatch quotas (ITBQ’s), fishing 
cooperatives, and voluntary group 
sanctions. 
Although not complete, this review 
of the bioeconomics of fisheries bycatch 
does provide a synthesis of the major 
results over the last 15 years of research. 
The next step is to assess these results 
in an integrated framework to compare 
and contrast their efficacy in measuring, 
managing, and eliminating the discard-
ing of bycatch in fisheries dependent 
upon living marine resources.
Simulation Model
Because bycatch is a complex prob-
lem, by necessity, a model to address 
bycatch is also complicated. Figure 1 
represents what is essentially a multi-
species, stock, cohort, resource area, 
fleet, and vessel class ecosystem model. 
Rather than pursuing a simplistic surplus 
production or Gordon-Schaeffer-Copes 
model of limited practical application, 
a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model 
(Beverton and Holt, 1957) is used to 
represent the population dynamics of 
a single or group of fish species. Al-
though alternatives are available within 
the model, the von Bertalanffy growth 
function is employed to determine the 
biomass level for each cohort of each 
species in this bycatch scenario (Quinn 
and Deriso, 1999). The level of biomass 
then influences natural mortality (M) 
in Figure 1 through a predator-prey 
model (Larkin, 1979), which is also 
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Figure 1.—Ecosystem simulation model.
affected by the biological dimension of 
the ecosystem (e.g., water temperature, 
salinity, acidity).
Applying fishing effort to biomass 
generates yield, which is mapped into 
fishing mortality (F) in Figure 1. Yield 
also directly and indirectly affects, via 
the human dimension, unit input costs 
through the supply function and output 
price through the demand function. 
The combined effect of price, cost, and 
biomass determine changes in the level 
of fishing effort that feeds back into 
the Beverton-Holt multi-cohort model 
through fishing mortality, in conjunction 
with natural mortality, to determine the 
change in number of fish in the next 
time period. 
The relationship between these dif-
ferent components and fishing effort is 
the key innovation that allows the ef-
fects of different bycatch strategies to 
be compared. Extending Clark (1990), 
a general theoretical relationship can 
be derived. Beginning with:
J H e R h dt
o
B F B h t
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( ) ( )
=
= −
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s.t.
The long run equilibrium fishing effort 
level is represented as: 
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where B is the change in biomass with 
respect to time, 
 F′(B) is the growth rate of the 
stock biomass (B),
 F(B) is the growth function,
 c(B) is harvest cost,
 P is the price of fish,
 d is the discount rate,
 R(h) is a nonlinear net revenue 
function = P(h)h – c(h),
 P(h) is an inverse demand 
function,
 h is harvest = qeix,
 ei is individual firm or angler 
fishing effort level (McConnell 
and Sutinen, 1979), and
 q is the catchability coefficient.
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 P′(qeiB) is marginal revenue 
with respect to a change in 
fishing effort, and
 PB(qeiB) is marginal revenue 
with respect to a change in 
stock size.
That is, regardless of the functional 
form chosen to represent a growth 
function or an inverse demand func-
tion, Equation 28 describes its rela-
tionship to fishing effort (e). Although 
magnitudes might change, Equation 
28 demonstrates that the direction 
of change remains the same across a 
broad array of functional forms chosen 
to represent a commercial or recre-
ational fishery.
The change in fishing effort level is 
calculated at the most disaggregated 
level in the simulation model to ensure 
that the conversion to fishing mortality 
(F) is not biased due to nonhomogene-
ity (Clark, 1985). This specification 
also allows the comparison of different 
management regimes; specifically for 
the sole owner (δ = 0), rights based (δ > 
0), and open-access (δ = ∞) scenarios.
This model is adapted to the study of 
bycatch by assuming that two fishing 
fleets exploit three out of seven species 
of fish, with ten cohorts each. Each spe-
cies is assumed to exist in two resource 
areas (fishing grounds). The first fishing 
fleet has a directed harvest from species 
1 and a partially or wholly discarded 
bycatch from species 2. The second fish-
ing fleet consists of two vessel classes 
that directly harvest species 2 as a com-
mercial and recreational set of fisheries. 
The third species is a protected resource 
that was initially harvested by both fish-
ing fleets, but now is solely treated as a 
predator of species 2 through 7; species 
4–7 act as prey of or competitors to the 
three fish species (species 1 to 3) being 
harvested.
Regulatory Effects
The bycatch reduction regulation 
of choice (BRD) developed out of the 
conservation engineering concept of 
fisheries management. Using a single-
species approach, the fishing gear is 
modified to eliminate the harvest of inci-
dentally caught fish species. These gear 
modifications, which have direct costs 
in and of themselves, can also increase 
or reduce the technical efficiency of the 
fishing gear for the directed species and 
indirectly increase or reduce the costs of 
harvesting fish, respectively. 
As demonstrated in Ward (1994) and 
Ward and Macinko (1996), the adoption 
of a gear modification to reduce bycatch 
in the directed species 1 fishery results 
in an initial increase in the biomass 
of the bycatch species 2, but does not 
prevent species 2 continued decline in 
biomass over time (Fig. 2). The con-
tinued decline in species 2 biomass is 
the combined effect of an increase in 
fishing effort levels for the commercial 
and recreational fishing fleet directed at 
species 2 (Fig. 3) and the growth in the 
predator species 3 that is recovering as 
a result of a reduction in its bycatch in 
the fishery for species 1 (Fig. 4).
Although the present value of net 
benefits peaked higher with BRD gear 
modifications than without, neither 
resulted in significant increases in com-
mercial fisherman or recreational angler 
quality of life (i.e., both are very close 
to zero due to resource rent dissipation 
in the open-access resource management 
scheme for species 1 and 2).
A second proposed bycatch reduction 
regulation is the adoption of a TAC for 
the bycatch of species 2 in the directed 
fishery for species 1. Although biomass 
level results are similar to Figure 1, the 
regulation causes the fishery for spe-
Figure 2.—Conservation engineering regulatory effect on 
bycatch species biomass.
Figure 3.—Change in species 2 fishing effort levels due to 
the adoption of a BRD in the fishery for species 1.
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cies 1 to be shut down when the bycach 
TAC is reached, causing harvest levels 
of species 1 to decline appreciably. 
This introduces an oscillation into the 
fishing effort level for the fisheries for 
species 2 (Fig. 5). Although the present 
value of net benefits improved with the 
adoption of the bycatch TAC, it was not 
appreciably different from zero. In fact, 
command and control regulations in the 
directed species 1 fishery neither im-
prove species 2 stock size nor improve 
net benefits in either fishery.
Surprisingly, the sole owner regula-
tion of the directed fishery does not 
necessarily improve performance in the 
fishery for the bycatch species 2 if the 
fishery remains managed as an open-
access resource. Figure 6 indicates that 
the switch to sole owner management 
causes a gradual decline in fishing effort 
levels and a commensurate reduction 
in the rate of decline in yield, in this 
example. However, even though net 
benefits improve (Fig. 7) for the directed 
fishery, bycatch continues to increase 
(Fig. 8). Only with the adoption of sole 
owner management in both directed 
commercial fisheries for species 1 and 
2 does a decline in bycatch levels in 
the directed fishery for species 1 result 
(Fig. 9). 
Unfortunately, maintaining the recre-
ational fishery as open-access results in 
the expansion of total fishing effort for 
species 2 even as fishing effort levels 
decline for its commercial fishery com-
ponent (Fig. 10). The rent-dissipating 
effects of the open-access recreational 
fishery prevent improvements in net 
benefits for both the commercial and 
recreational fisheries even though the di-
rected commercial fishery for species 1 
has marked increases in net benefits over 
time due to sole owner management.
Finally, combining sole ownership 
management in the commercial fish-
eries directed at species 1 and 2 with 
BRD’s should result in substantial re-
ductions in the bycatch of species 2 in 
the directed fishery for species 1. The 
resulting short-term increase in species 
2 biomass does cause some unexpected 
results. Figure 11 indicates that the 
adoption of BRD’s in the fishery for 
species 1 results in an increased oscil-
lation in the total fishing effort for the 
fisheries directed at species 2, relative 
to Figure 10, as the recreational open-
access fishery expands its effort levels, 
augmenting uncertainty and risk levels 
in this fishery.
Summary
Presentations on the ecosystems ap-
proach to fisheries management often 
tout the importance of the economic 
component. Although the biophysi-
cal components are fully presented 
and discussed in these presentations, 
rarely if ever is the role of economics 
or other social sciences explained in 
an ecosystem context. This attempt, 
although simplistic, indicates the need 
to explicitly consider fishery economic 
relationships.
Bycatch, the discarding of inciden-
tally caught fish in fishing operations, is 
the perfect analogue for the ecosystems 
approach to fisheries management. A 
seemingly simplistic fisheries manage-
ment problem in appearance, bycatch 
has biophysical and socio-cultural at-
tributes that result in counter-intuitive 
and even paradoxical outcomes that 
create a complex, intricate management 
environment. The changes in gover-
nance assessed in a simulation model 
using this multi-disciplinary scientific 
approach to modeling the ecosystem 
Figure 4.—Change in biomass of species 3 over time after 
adoption of BRD in the fishery for species 1.
Figure 5.—Fishery 1 bycatch TAC effect on fishing effort 
levels for species 2 fisheries.
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Figure 6.—Transition from open access to sole ownership in 
the directed species fishery.
Figure 7.—Transition from open access to sole ownership 
for commercial fishery 1.
Figure 8.—Transition from open access to sole ownership 
in fishery 1 for species 2 bycatch level.
Figure 9.—Transition from open access to sole ownership 
for all commercial fisheries.
resulted in unexpected oscillations that 
would increase uncertainty and risk in 
the fisheries affected.
Although the results predicted by 
the theoretical analyses generally 
hold, another example of unexpected 
and counterintuitive responses occurs 
with the adoption of predator-prey and 
competitor ecological relationships 
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Figure 10.—Open access to sole ownership transition for 
the directed commercial fishery for species 2.
Figure 11.—Sole ownership with conservation engineering.
in the biological component of the 
ecosystem model. The overwhelming 
effect of the growing biomass of the 
competitor–predator species (Species 
3–7) prevented the recovery of the by-
catch species (Species 2) in our simu-
lation model under any management 
scenario. In addition, the application 
of sole owner governance (ITQ, sector 
shares, catch shares, cooperatives, etc.) 
to commercial fisheries without consid-
ering the recreational component still 
resulted in the dissipation of resource 
rents. Even though simulation models 
can generate different results depend-
ing on the values used to parameterize 
the theoretical economic and biological 
relationships, management approaches 
to dealing with bycatch and discarding 
can have radically different effects on 
the fisheries involved.
If nothing else comes from this 
assessment of bycatch reduction man- 
agement techniques applied to an 
ecosystem that explicitly incorporates 
the human dimension, it should now 
at least be clear that the traditional 
practice of simply assuming that net 
benefits exist for any proposed bio-
physical management regulation is 
problematic. This approach incorpo-
rates socio-cultural and biophysical 
attributes into a common framework 
from which 1) the magnitude and 
direction of behavioral responses can 
be predicted based on changes in gov-
ernance or biophysical constraints, 2) 
the attainment of management goals 
and objectives can be assessed, and 3) 
metrics can be derived.
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